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x Three-level random intercept (TLRI) model to rank the performance of different 
countries 
x TLRI model treats policy commitment as a latent variable 
x Estimated conditional on the difficulty of the policy portfolio implemented by each country 
x Application to energy efficiency policies in the industrial sectors of 29 EU countries 2004-2011 
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1. Introduction 
The COP21 Conference in Paris gave new impetus to efforts towards limiting 
greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs). As testified by the national pledges and the signing 
of the Paris Treaty, many countries committed to implementing policies supporting 
sustainable development through the promotion of renewable energy sources and 
increased energy efficiency. Indeed, European countries have been at the forefront of 
fighting climate change. For instance, cleaner energy is one of the five objectives of 
Europe 2020, the sustainable growth strategy that EU member states launched in 2010 
as a response to the recent global economic crisis.
1
 
In light of this renewed commitment, a major challenge for researchers and policy 
makers alike is the assessment of past energy and environmental policies, and 
specifically how countries are performing in this respect. This question is important for 
both policy evaluation and for research purposes. 
First, appropriately describing and understanding the past performance of countries 
with respect to energy and environmental policies, and their ability to commit to a more 
or less complex portfolios of policy instruments, is a crucial step in ensuring that future 
interventions are drafted in a sound and cost-effective way. An in-depth analysis in this 
respect is currently missing due to lack of appropriate data and to more complex 
conceptual problems linked with the creation of appropriate indicators.  
Second, the availability of sound indicators of policy commitment and stringency 
would allow for more solid empirical research on the inducement effects of such 
                                                          
1 The Europe 2020 strategy includes five main objectives: ensuring 75 % employment of 20/64-year-old; 
Getting 3% of the EUs GDP invested into research and development; limiting greenhouse gas emissions 
by 20 % or even 30 % compared to 1990 levels, creating 20 % of EU energy needs from renewables and 
increasing energy efficiency by 20 %; reducing school dropout rates to below 10 %, with at least 40 % of 
30/34-year-old completing tertiary education; ensuring 20 million fewer people are at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion. The environment and energy objective summarizes the so-called 20-20 Climate and 
Energy Package approved in 2007 by the EC and subsequently translated into a set of five directives 
approved in 2009. 
*Revised Manuscript
Click here to view linked References
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policies for innovation, competitiveness and economic performance more in general. 
Indeed, the poor quality of available indicators is often cited as one of the major 
shortcomings of the empirical literature dealing with such research questions. 
As pointed out in Brunel and Levinson (2013, 2016), assessments of environmental 
and energy policy are characterized by major challenges. First, to address climate and 
energy concerns countries can choose from a wide array of policy instruments, each of 
which is characterized by a different level of effectiveness, dynamic efficiency and 
political acceptability (Fisher and Newell, 2008). This “multidimensionality” translates 
into the challenge of building a policy indicator able to capture the different aspects of a 
country’s policy portfolio. Second, the ability of countries to implement certain (lower 
cost) options might depend crucially on some “initial condition” or on some time 
varying characteristics. For instance, the complexity and stringency of a country’s 
policy portfolio at any given point in time is likely higher for those countries which 
have been committed to sustainable energy for a longer period of time. While these 
countries may appear has having an overall higher score, their efforts over a given 
period of time may be lower than that of countries which only recently committed to 
GHG reductions and energy efficiency. On the one hand, latecomers to climate 
mitigations may be asked to bridge the gap in environmental protection very swiftly 
upon joining international organizations (such as the OECD or the EU). On the other 
hand, forerunners in environmental protection may have already reaped the low hanging 
fruits, and any increase in policy commitment and stringency may be particularly 
difficult due to higher marginal costs in terms of economic performance or political and 
social support.  
This state of affairs makes it hard to build a comprehensive indicator to assess 
countries’ performance in the realm of environmental and energy policy. In addition, the 
data available to the researcher is poor to begin with, as even collecting information on 
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the stringency of all the different policy instruments put in place is challenging. 
Actually, data in this respect is scarce or imperfect. Most databases only provide a count 
of the different policy interventions implemented in any country, often categorizing 
them by policy instrument, as in MURE (2012) or IEA (2012). The few attempts to 
provide qualitative scores together with counts of policies have been criticized since 
they rest on assessments by experts, which are often perceived as arbitrary. Indeed, to 
date the efforts to produce environmental policy indexes for a large number of countries 
and for long time frames has been severely limited by lack of data. 
This paper is a methodological contribution aimed at showing the potential of a 
model, which has been largely applied in statistics, for the field of energy and 
environmental policy assessment. We propose a novel approach to score countries with 
respect to their commitment to environmental and energy policy. Recognizing the 
fundamental challenges characterizing data on energy and environmental policy (Brunel 
and Levinson, 2013; Nesta, Vona, and Nicolli, 2014; Galeotti, Salini, and Verdolini, 
2017), we show how a three level random intercept (TLRI) model inspired by Item 
Response Theory (IRT) can be of help to score the policy performance of different 
countries in a given sector. This model allows using the count of policy instruments by 
type, active in a given country in a given year, to characterize the complexity of a 
country’s policy portfolio and its level of policy commitment. 
To illustrate the potential of this approach, as well as its limitations, we estimate the 
model using data on policies promoting energy efficiency in the industrial sector in a 
sample of 29 European countries over the years 2004-2011. The contribution of our 
analysis to the literature is fourfold. First, our approach has relatively few data 
requirements and allows exploring the scarce information available on environmental 
and energy policies to the fullest. Second, the TLRI model allows building an index to 
assess and compare countries’ environmental policy portfolios and performance 
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addressing the aforementioned issue multidimensionality. The score we build accounts 
for the type, number and complexity of the policy instruments implemented in each of 
the countries in our sample. Third, the TLRI model can be augmented with a latent 
regression. This allows to condition the “raw” country score on specific observables at 
the beginning and during our sample period, thus addressing the problem of “initial 
conditions” noted above. Fourth, our methodology provides a unified framework to rate 
policy commitment and stringency (through a three level random intercept model) and 
to study its determinants (through a latent regression). It is therefore of potential 
relevance also for applications on a variety of research questions where a key 
requirement is the creation of a policy indicator cleaned from reverse causality and from 
the effect of covariates. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the 
available literature and highlights the contributions of this paper. Section 3 presents the 
proposed statistical model. Its empirical application, which focuses on energy efficiency 
policies in Europe, is presented in Section 4. We describe therein the data and report the 
empirical results, which include country rankings which account for (a) the complexity 
of the policy mix put into place and (b) the effect of economic and institutional 
observables. Section 5 concludes with a summary of main results, policy implications 
and a list of future research avenues. 
2. Literature Review 
Assessing the economic impact of policy decisions is of central interest to 
Economics. As environmental and energy policy has become increasingly active 
worldwide in the last decades, several efforts were undertaken to ascertain the 
consequences of decisions concerning energy efficiency, renewable energy sources, 
emission reductions, and the like, on key variables such as innovation activity, 
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economic growth or overall economic performance. A critical issue is of course the 
definition of an appropriate indicator of policy commitment and stringency. This is a 
topic that has received recently increasing attention.  Brunel and Levinson (2013) 
provide a comprehensive review of the literature in this respect. 
Popular proxies for regulatory stringency are data on private sector abatement 
expenditures (Pollution Abatement Costs, or PACs). Such data inform on the level of 
financial effort a given firm/sector has to face to comply with given standards (Lanjouw 
and Mody, 1996; Jaffe and Palmer, 1997; Berman and Bui, 2001; Hamamoto, 2006; 
Rubashkina et al., 2014).
2
 Reductions in emissions or pollutants or indicators based on 
energy use are other popular indicators of choice (Cole and Elliot, 2003; Gollop and 
Roberts, 1983). Changes in regulation-based measures have also been used to judge the 
level of policy stringency (Popp, 2003, 2010). A different tack has been taken by the 
numerous papers which made use of general composite indexes through the use of 
aggregation techniques. The data used to that end include information on the presence 
or absence of a given policy (0-1 indicators) or on scores from surveys of government 
officials or business leaders (Tobey, 1990; Kellenberg, 2009). Finally, many have 
resorted to ad hoc data sets which are tailored to answering a specific research question 
(Jeppsen and Folmer, 2001). 
Brunel and Levinson (2013) nicely describe the main conceptual issues that plague 
almost all previous efforts to create an index of energy and environmental policy 
stringency. 
First, creating a reliable indicator is challenging due to the issue of 
“multidimensionality”. Governments regulate various aspects of energy production and 
environmental protection, namely air, water, toxic chemicals, but also energy efficiency 
                                                          
2 The use of this indicator is based on the assumption that profit maximizing firms typically face 
marginal abatement costs that are increasing in pollution abatement. 
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and renewable energy production. Moreover, policy instruments can be aimed at 
regulating pollution directly, through either a command-and-control or a market-based 
approach. In addition, environmental and energy policies per se can be combined with 
policies aimed at addressing the knowledge market failure and can stimulate the 
creation and diffusion of less polluting technologies.
3 Such heterogeneity in policy 
responses and in the sectors targeted makes it hard to build an indicator that is at the 
same time comprehensive and detailed enough to capture changes in all different 
aspects of a country’s policy portfolio. 
Second, while policy makers and researchers ideally would want to measure the 
effect of policy on other important outcome variables such as industry location, trade 
patterns, economic growth or knowledge transfer, the variables measuring the 
stringency of environmental regulation are plagued by simultaneity and endogeneity.
4
 
One must therefore bear in mind that policies are often jointly determined with other 
outcome variables and that they themselves are not exogenous, but are the result of 
forces within the economic system. 
Finally, some countries/sectors might have a “comparative” advantage with respect 
to others in implementing strict environmental policy. This might be due to their 
industrial composition, but also to the vintage of capital, to the fact that they are more 
polluting to begin with, or to the fact that they are latecomers in environmental and 
energy regulation. This gives them the option to implement more easily low-cost high-
                                                          
3 Environmental (and energy) policy directly targets the environmental externality by regulating 
pollutants or emissions. On the one hand, command-and-control policy instruments include mandates and 
standards, which set a minimum requirement for firms to comply with. On the other hand, market-based 
approaches such as taxes and permits allow firms to respond more flexibly to comply with the regulation. 
Conversely, technology policy targets the knowledge market failure and supports R&D in cleaner and 
more efficient technologies with, among other options, research subsidies and investments. See, for 
instance, Perman et al. (2011). 
4 An example of simultaneity relates to the fact that pollution-intensive industries may have more 
lobbying power the greater their share of a country’s economy, they may pressure their governments to 
enact less stringent regulations. See the discussion in Brunel and Levinson (2013) and the references 
therein. 
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reduction (or high-efficiency improvement) policies. 
Indeed, all the indicators proposed in the literature so far suffer from one or more of 
these shortcomings. For instance, PACs are plagued with reverse causality issues and in 
the presence of market or behavioral failures they no longer successfully measure the 
level of regulatory pressure (Berman and Bui, 2001).
5 Emission or energy-use based 
indicators are also likely to mirror changes other than regulatory stringency, such as for 
example factor prices. Moreover, when used at the disaggregated level, it is often hard 
to build indicators that can be used in cross sectoral or cross-country analyses due to the 
heterogeneity of the regulated pollutants. Proxies based on normative prescriptions do 
not account for the level of actual enforcement of a given policy and might also be 
subject to issues of reverse causality (Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003; Shimshack and 
Ward, 2005). Finally, most composite indicators are built using simple approaches such 
as the sum of policy instruments. 
Among the most recent attempts to overcome some of these shortcomings are 
statistical aggregation techniques. Nicolli and Vona (2012) propose two different 
aggregate indicators to measure the level of renewable environmental policies in 
European countries. First, an average-based indicator which uses information on the 
timing of adoption of a given policy instrument (namely, an average of dummy 
variables indicators equal to zero before the instrument is put into place and equal to 
one after- wards). Second, a more complex indicator is built using principal component 
analysis (PCA) relying both on dummy variables and on intensity of specific policy 
instruments such as Renewable Energy Certificates or Feed-in Tariffs. The factor 
loadings resulting from the PCA in Nicolli and Vona (2012) can be interpreted as 
                                                          
5 Moreover, if the data are used at the aggregate level, such as sectors or countries, changes in PACs 
might result from changes due to unobserved heterogeneity rather than from changes in regulatory 
stringency. 
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importance weights which vary by item/policy.
6
 
Another composite index is the OECD EPS composite indicator (Botta and Koźluk, 
2014). It relies on a recent database produced by the OECD which includes fifteen 
continuous policy indicators which are then categorized as a Likert scale from 0 to 6 by 
identifying specific bins. These fifteen Likert-scale scores are then aggregated into 6 
large macro-instruments: Taxes, Certificates, Limits, Feed-in Tariffs (FIT), Deposit 
Refund Schemes (DRS), and R&D by using weights. Subsequently, these six indicators 
are aggregated into a Market-Based (MB) score (Taxes, Certificates, FIT, DRS) and a 
Non Market-Based (NMB) score (R&D and Standards). The EPS Composite score is 
then obtained as the average between the MB and NMB scores. 
One last composite indicator worth mentioning is the Index of Climate Policy Action 
(Schaffrin, Sewerin, and Seubert, 2015). This index combines density and intensity of 
the policy portfolio, with the former accounting for the number of policy instruments of 
the portfolio, and the latter providing information on the content of those instruments.. 
Here a weighting scheme is used for the following intensity measures: objectives, scope, 
integration, budget, implementation, and monitoring. The coding of these measures is 
based on expert judgement and the index is computed for the energy supply sector of 
Austria, Germany, and the U.K. over the period 1998-2010.   
In this paper, we propose to use a TLRI mode, which is inspired by Item Response 
Theory (IRT) models which are widely applied in the statistical literature of scoring. To 
illustrate the potential of this novel approach, which is specifically designed to deal with 
the presence of several policy instruments as well as with longitudinal data, we apply it 
to the scoring of policies supporting energy efficiency in Europe. Finally, we show how 
                                                          
6 In their approach, however, PCA is built using binary indicators of the presence/absence of a given 
policy instrument and no consideration is given to the number of policies in place at any given time. 
Moreover, Ferrari and Salini (2011) hold that the presence of dummy variables should require Categorical 
Principal Components Analysis (CATPCA) which is not based on the assumption of linear correlation. 
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TLRI models can be used to produce an indicator of policy commitment which is clean 
from the effect of observables affecting both policy instrument choice and 
implementation. 
3. Methodology 
A proper understanding of the empirical approach proposed in this paper requires a 
short digression on Rasch models, which are a particular class of Item Response Theory 
models (Rasch, 1980; van der Linden and Hambleton 1997; Baker and Kim 2004). IRT 
models were developed as a psychometric tool in social sciences to compare the 
performance of various subjects in questionnaires/tests, i.e. to characterize individual 
ability along a continuum. IRT models rest on the underlying hypothesis that the 
phenomenon to be measured represents a latent factor, namely something that cannot be 
observed directly, but only measured indirectly by many variables whose categories 
represent different aspects and/or levels of the latent dimension.  
The application of IRT models was then extended beyond psychometrics to all those 
applications in which the variable of interest cannot be measured with conventional 
means, but rather quantified by assuming a latent variable, such as intelligence, 
mathematical or verbal ability, racial prejudice, political attitude, consumer preferences. 
Hence, IRT models found applications in fields such as psychology, education, 
sociology, marketing, and medicine, among others. Thus, for instance, Bacci (2012) and 
Bacci and Bartolucci (2012) apply IRT to the scoring of quality of life, Bacci and 
Caviezel (2011) use it to score teaching evaluation and Gnaldi et al. (2016) assess 
students’ acquired skills and cluster students according to their ability level. These 
models have found application also in organizational and management studies in 
particular for financial issues (Soutar and Cronish-Ward, 1997), marketing and 
consumer behavior (Fischer et al., 2006; Salzberg and Sinkovics, 2006) and tourism 
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management (Oreja-Rodriguez and Yanes-Estevez, 2007). Ferrari et al. (2005) explore 
the validity and constraints of this approach as a tool to quantify the degree of 
vulnerability of historical-architectonic buildings in Northern Italy. Finally, Murray and 
Mills (2012) apply a similar methodology to the scoring of energy insecurity of 
households in the United States. 
Among the several classes of IRT models, the Rasch model (1980) is a statistical 
model for dichotomous data in which the probability of observing a positive/correct 
response to each item/question by each individual is modeled as a decreasing function 
of the item’s “difficulty” (“complexity”) and as an increasing function of the subject’s 
“ability”.7 As in other IRT models, both these variables are modeled as latent traits and 
estimated using data on how each individual performs with respect to a given item. 
Specifically, the probability of a correct response by individual j (j = 1,2,…J) on item i 
(i  = 1,2,…I) ,         , is a function of the two latent traits, namely it is increasing in 
the respondent’s ability (   and decreasing in the item difficulty (   : 
 
(1)                   
             
               
  
 
By using information on whether a given subject replied correctly to a given question, 
the Rasch model (RM) is able to estimate the latent traits θ and β. 
The original RM built for dichotomous dependent variables has been extended along 
several dimensions. Firstly, polytomous models have been developed to deal with 
ordinal data (Mair and Hatzinger, 2007). To this end, the RM model is modified to 
                                                          
7 In the Rasch model context, the definition of what an “item” represents depends on the focus of the 
analysis. In those analyses scoring pupils performance, each item can for instance represent a question 
within a larger questionnaire. In assessments of either physical or psychological wellbeing, an “item” is a 
particular set of characteristics (for instance, fatigue, ability to concentrate, etc.). In the analysis of 
Murray and Mills (2012) each item is a different question focusing on ability to pay for electricity bill, 
access to electricity, etc. As explained more in detail below, in this analysis an item is defined as one 
specific policy type and a subject is a given country (see below). 
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11  
estimate k “thresholds” for the m categories of data (for example, with four categories 
ranging from 0 to 4, the model estimates three thresholds: 0-1, 1-2, 2-3). The 
“thresholds” are defined as those points in which two adjacent items scores have the 
same probability of being observed in the specific response under consideration. Within 
the class of polytomous RMs, in Rating Scale Models (Andersen, 1997) the threshold 
values are assumed to be equal across all items/questions (namely, each of the item is 
scored on the same number of categories), even though the distance between two 
thresholds can differ (Andrich, 1978). In more complex Partial Credit Models (PCM) 
(Masters and Wright, 1997) the estimated thresholds are allowed to differ also by 
item/question (namely, each of the items can have a different number of categories). 
The PCM logistic model reads as follows: 
 
(2)                  
              
 
    
               
 
    
 
   
  
 
where k=0,...,m-1 indicate the number of thresholds, y=0,…,m indicate the response 
categories, and τik denotes the item difficulty and threshold parameter jointly for each 
item.  
Secondly, Longitudinal RMs have been developed to handle panel data observations, as 
opposed to cross sections, to study changes in “ability” scores over time (Fischer, 1989). 
Thirdly, RMs have been augmented with a latent regression in order to study the 
determinants of a subject’s ability (De Boeck and Wilson, 2004). This allows 
conditioning the individual’s estimated “ability” parameter on a set of observables, thus 
cleansing the parameter itself from the effect of any socio-economic characteristics so 
that it truly measures a latent trait. 
RMs have been applied in a variety of fields with the aim of scoring performance 
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along a specified dimension, as noted above. Here, we apply a modified version of the 
RM to score the performance of countries with respect to environmental and energy 
policy. There are three main features of RMs which are of particular relevance in this 
respect, and which have not been exploited by any previous study. Firstly, these models 
were created to handle the treatment of many interrelated variables with the aim of 
summarizing data and highlighting possible latent factors, scoring subjects along a 
continuum. Secondly, the data requirements to estimate such models are relatively 
limited: in theory, it is possible to estimate “item scores” and “ability scores” just 
knowing whether a country has implemented or not a specific policy instrument 
(dichotomous model), or the number of regulations for each policy instrument which 
were implemented (polytomous model). Thirdly, it is possible to create a model which 
allows to handle longitudinal data as well as to condition the estimated “ability” scores 
on observables which are likely to affect such scores through the use of a latent 
regression. Hence, RMs can potentially address the main shortcomings noted before 
linked with the creation of indexes scoring environmental and energy policy: 
multidimensionality, need for a time-varying indicator, and issue linked with controlling 
for differences in “initial conditions”. 
The Three-Level Random Intercept (TLRI) model we propose here is a refinement of 
RMs and is a 3-level application of multilevel models which are appropriate for 
research designs where data are organized in more than one level (Goldstein, 2011).
8
 
Specifically, it is an ordinal logistic model for adjacent item scores following Bacci and 
Caviezel (2011) which is augmented by latent regressions as in de Boek and Wilson 
(2004).  
                                                          
8 While in this paper we apply a multi-level model to the scoring of countries’ environmental and 
energy policy, the typical example of multilevel models is a two level model of test scores by pupils 
(lower level) nested within classes (higher level) See Goldstein (2011) for a thorough discussion of such 
models 
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In our TLRI model, a country corresponds to a “subject”, while different types of 
policy instruments are modelled as different “items”. The score for each item is defined 
as the number of regulations active in a given country in a given year for each specific 
policy category. Given that the total scores on each item differ by policy instrument (as 
explained above), the number of categories for each item in our TLRI are allowed to be 
different by item. This is similar to the PCM framework discussed above.  
By construction, the TLRI the model clusters data in three levels: item scores for 
each item (environmental policy instrument) and subject (country) are clustered for each 
year, and all the item scores for each year and each subject are clustered by subject. 
Hence, the three levels assumed in the model are item (i.e., policy instrument -- first 
level), year (second level) and subject (i.e. country -- third level). The model reads as 
follows: 
 
(3)                     
                           
 
    
                           
 
    
 
   
  
 
where P(.) is the probability that the score Yitj on item/policy i (i = 1, . . . , I) in time t (t 
= 1,...,T) for country j (j = 1, . . . , J) assumes a given value y, where y is the number of 
regulations for the given policy category. The parameter βi describes the average 
difficulty of the i-th policy category (i.e. item). The parameter τik indicates the different 
threshold in each item/policy score. The two random effects θ0tj and θ00j are the latent 
variables measuring a subject’s ability/performance (i.e. they replace the θ parameter in 
the RMs described above). θ0tj and θ00j are both obtained as the expected a posteriori 
(empirical) Bayes predictions, namely the posterior distributions of the country 
parameters given the policy responses. θ0tj is the second level residuals and indicates the 
deviation of the latent variable θ for year t and country j from the average value of 
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country j: accordingly, they allow for an analysis of time within each country. θ00j is the 
third-level residuals indicate the deviation of the latent variable for county j from the 
average value of the population: they thus allow for a ranking of countries in terms of 
the mean level of ability/performance. θ0tj and θ00j  are independent and normally 
distributed random variables with zero means and constant variances. 
τik, θ0tj and θ00j are the parameters of interest for our analysis. The threshold 
parameters τik, vary across different policy categories (items) and can be used to 
characterize the level of complexity/difficulty of the policy portfolio implemented in 
each year. The second level residuals, θ0tj, allow tracking the performance of each 
country throughout the sample period with respect to its average. Finally, the third-level 
residuals θ00j represent the source of information of greatest use in our case as they 
allow the ranking of countries with respect to their observed composite indicator of 
environmental and energy policies over the sample period. Note that these parameters 
are obtained conditional on the complexity of the policy portfolio in each year and on 
the overall commitment of each country with respect to policy implementation. 
Comparing the θ00j for the different countries allows us to characterize how they 
perform in terms energy and environmental policy.  
The TLRI model provides us with: (i) threshold parameters measuring the intrinsic 
difficulty/probability of observing a given categorical response for each item/policy 
instrument (τik); (ii) time-country specific intercepts for each country over time (θ0tj) and 
(iii) country-specific parameters which allow for an overall country ranking in the 
period under consideration (θ00j). The elements (ii) and (iii) are derived conditional on 
the policy category difficulty levels. 
Following de Boeck and Wilson (2004), the TLRI can be augmented with two latent 
regressions, one for θ0tj and one for θ00j. This allows conditioning the estimation of these 
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two latent traits on certain observable variables which are likely to affect the 
score/performance of countries in each year and on average. Indeed, the ability of each 
country to implement, say, energy efficiency policies may be affected by institutional 
and economic characteristics. For example, certain countries could rank highest because 
they have better starting conditions (for instance, they might have more room to phase 
out old capital equipment because they have a higher GDP). We thus include the vectors 
of covariates Xj for the third-level residuals θ00j for each country j and a vector of 
covariates Ztj for the second level residuals θ0tj for each year t and for each country j, 
respectively as: 
 
(4)                    
 
and: 
 
(5)                     
 
The model (3) hence becomes: 
 
(6)                     
          
      
                      
 
    
          
      
                      
 
    
 
   
 
 
By augmenting the TLRI model with latent regressions, the parameters of interest 
become the residual components ε0tj and ε00j. These residuals are cleaned from the 
“comparative advantage” effect or any causality between the policy indicator and the 
covariates. To illustrate the usefulness of this proposed approach, the next Section 
discusses the application of the TLRI model both with and without latent regressions, to 
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the scoring of energy efficiency policy commitment in the EU28 members and Norway 
in the manufacturing sector. 
4. Empirical Application 
To better understand the potential of the model we described above, we use it to 
study the performance of the 28 EU Member States plus Norway with respect to 
policies promoting the rational use of energy and end-use renewables in the 
manufacturing sector over the years 2004-2011. The choice of time window and 
countries was determined by data availability, as explained below.  
 
4.1. Data and Estimation Method 
The data, which consists of a set of policy indicators, are extracted from the MURE 
(2012) database. We focus on policies for energy efficiency in the manufacturing sector 
because these are expected to provide a significant contribution to climate change 
mitigation. The time spell of the analysis is determined by the fact that in the years 
2004-2011 the MURE database contains information for all EU28 countries plus 
Norway.9 The MURE database includes the national policies targeting energy efficiency 
that have macro-economic impact, imposing a quality threshold which eliminates low-
impact policies. The database provides information on five different environmental 
policy categories:10 
                                                          
9 The MURE database contains detailed country fact sheets reflecting the adoption time of energy 
efficiency policy measures in 28 EU Member States plus Norway over the period 1993-2011. Data is 
available from 1993 for 16 (Old Member) countries, and from 2004 for the other 13 countries. 
10 In theory, we could also consider an additional “item” (policy instrument), namely those policies which 
support innovation in energy efficient technologies through, for example, R&D investment or incentives. 
We chose not to do so for two reasons. First, the timing of the impact of innovation policies is very 
different, as they work on a longer time frame than policies directly regulating the environmental 
externality. Their impact is thus likely to occur with a lag because the invention of new technologies 
requires time. Second, given this difference in timing, the availability of novel improved technologies is 
in fact an enabling factor that would make the implementation of stringent environmental policies more 
likely. Setting stringent performance standards or costly taxes on energy use is more politically and 
socially feasible if highly efficient equipment is already available to firms and consumers to purchase. 
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1. Regulatory policies include norms and standards, such as energy efficiency levels for 
various kinds of equipment and production processes or products, which often are 
based on the phase out of old technologies. 
2. Voluntary agreements include the creation of industry/government co-operation, as 
well as various industry initiatives aimed at promoting higher levels of energy 
efficiency. 
3. Financial incentives include investment subsidies and low interest loans, as well as 
incentives and subsidies for energy audits. 
4. Environmental taxes/Fiscal reductions include tax credits and exemptions which are 
put in place to target higher levels of efficiency within industrial sectors. 
5. Informational and educational programs are aimed at increasing the awareness of 
technology users and their knowledge about opportunities for efficiency 
improvements. 
The dimensions of our data are therefore: (i) the single policy instrument, (ii) the 
policy type or category (as spelled above), (iii) the country, and (iv) the year. 
To estimate our model, we construct an ordered categorical variable for each policy 
instrument by counting the specific policies which are active in any given year. The 
number of categories differs for each instrument. For Regulatory policies we have: 0, 1, 
2 or more; Voluntary measures: 0, 1, 2, 3 or more; for Financial instruments: 0, 1, 2, 3, 
4 or more; for Fiscal/tax reductions: 1, 2, 3 or more; for Information/Education: 0, 1, 2, 
3 or more. Figure 1 provides an overview of the data by type of instrument and country. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Hence, measures related to increasing the supply of efficiency technologies are considered as entering the 
latent regression that explains policy implementation, as explained later in this Section. This 
notwithstanding, the results including items indicating support to technology development (and excluding 
these variables from the latent regression) are available from the authors upon request, and do not 
significantly differ from the ones presented here. 
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As apparent from the Figure, some countries such as Germany, France and Finland, 
score higher than other countries. However, they also exhibit lower variation throughout 
the sample period. Most Eastern European countries, such as for example Romania, 
increase rather significantly their commitment to energy efficiency towards the middle 
of the sample period. Regulatory measures are among the least implemented across the 
sample, while Financial instruments are widely used. Voluntary policy and Education 
are relatively unexploited in most countries. 
The TLRI model with and without latent regression presented in Section 3 are 
estimated on this data using the GLLAMM routine in STATA (Rabe-Hesketh et al., 
2004). 
 
4.2. Descriptive Three Level Random Intercept Model 
Estimates for each of the parameter thresholds are reported in Table 1. The estimated 
thresholds give then rise to a category probability curve for each of the policy 
instruments analyzed. These curves can be visualized as shown in Figure 2. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
The assumption that thresholds differ by policy instrument or category, as in the 
PCM framework, is confirmed by the empirical findings. The estimated thresholds for 
the different policy instruments are also generally significant, with the exception of the 
second and third thresholds associated with financial instruments (i.e. the thresholds 
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between one and two policy instruments and two and three policy instruments). This 
lack of significance indicates that having either two or three fiscal policies in place (as 
opposed to none or one, or more than three) is not the most likely response in any 
portion of the latent continuum. As Fischer and Parzer (1991) argue, this is an indication 
that the third and fourth categories (two and three fiscal policies in place, respectively) 
are less popular than the other categories. Indeed, Panel c Figure 1 shows a sort of 
“bimodal” distribution of countries with respect to the fiscal policy instruments, with 
most countries engaging either very little (one fiscal policy or none) or significantly 
(four or more fiscal policies). This is for instance the case of Italy, Lithuania and Latvia. 
While the model itself cannot provide an explanation of why this is the case, a possible 
conjecture is that countries offer a portfolio of financial instruments at a time to promote 
the increase of efficiency in the industrial sectors, or, alternatively, that once countries 
engage in this direction, the instruments then quickly become one popular approach to 
support energy efficiency.  
Furthermore, with the exception of the third threshold calculated for Voluntary 
measures, all the significant thresholds follow a sequential ordering. This means that for 
all policy categories considered, each threshold is higher than the previous one. A 
possible explanation for the exception, which mirrors the insights from general 
economic literature and policy debate, is that voluntary policy measures are not 
stringent, and therefore not very difficult to implement, as they do not require the 
imposition of any limitation on the economic agents. Hence, once countries engage 
more extensively in this type of approach, it is not necessarily harder, or more difficult, 
to implement yet another intervention of this type (going, for instance, from two to three 
voluntary measures).  
Overall, our estimates support the hypothesis of well-behaved thresholds. This 
means, as explained for instance in Murray and Mills (2012), that each possible 
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response has a portion of the latent continuum where it is the most likely response. 
Conditional on the estimated item thresholds, the variance of second level (time) 
residual θ0tj and of the third level (country) residual θ00j are estimated at 9.46e-21 with a 
standard error 1.953e-11 and 0.730 with a standard error 0.22, respectively. Both effects 
are therefore significant. Note however that the second level variance, which indicates 
deviations over time of each country’s aggregate score from its own mean, is extremely 
low in absolute value, while the third level variance, indicating the variation of country 
scores from the overall mean, is higher in absolute value. The between-country variation 
over our sample period is thus much higher than within-country variation over time. 
Given the estimated variance of second and third level residuals, we can obtain the 
latent traits as the posterior Bayes estimates from the model. We focus first on the 
country latent trait and present a ranking of countries in Figure 3 which also displays 
confidence intervals for the estimates. The ranking emerging from the descriptive TLRI 
model indicates that, conditional on the difficulty of the chosen policy portfolio, 
Luxembourg and Portugal are among the worst performing countries in Europe in terms 
of addressing energy efficiency concerns. Note that confidence intervals for the 
different countries in our sample greatly overlap, indicating that the performance of 
different EU countries is not strikingly different. Exceptions are Germany and France, 
which are at the top of the ranking and whose confidence intervals do not overlap with 
that of other countries. This is consistent with both common knowledge and evidence 
from the general debate regarding the stringency of environmental policies in different 
countries, which put Germany and France at the frontier of promoting energy efficiency 
in the industrial sectors (Scholoman et al. 2015; Egger et al. 2013).  
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
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Finally, we plot the posterior Bayes estimates for each year and country in Figure 4. 
The figure displays the evolution of the time profile (second level residual) which 
differs between countries. 
We note that, among the New Member countries, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic considerably increase their policy effort over 
the sample period. Conversely, the improvements during the early years in Croatia and 
Cyprus are not sustained over time. As far as the Old Member countries are concerned, 
Greece, Ireland and Sweden show the highest increase of their policy effort over time. 
Italy also increases its commitment, but only in the early years of the sample. Several 
countries that scored low on policy performance according to Figure 3 do not show 
improvements over time. This is the case for Luxembourg, Poland, Malta, the Czech 
Republic and Slovenia. 
 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
 
4.3 Explanatory Three Level Random Intercept Model 
The latent traits emerging from the descriptive TLRI model – and hence the time 
profiles in Figure 2 and the ranking in Figure 3 – are likely affected by observable 
country characteristics, as discussed in Section 3. For example, Germany and France 
may score best due to higher commitment to energy efficiency over the sample period, 
or simply because they are among the richest in the sample, being on top of the ranking 
at the beginning of the sample period, and sustained their position. 
In order to clean the estimated country latent traits, we control for several 
observable characteristics through latent regressions at both the second and the third 
level. Specifically, we assume that within country variation (namely the likelihood that 
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a countries increases the number of energy efficiency policies in the manufacturing 
sector year after year) is affected by energy prices, the weight of the manufacturing 
sector vis-à-vis other sectors in the economy, the past performance of a country in terms 
of energy intensity of the overall economy, its dependence on energy inputs and the 
availability of low-carbon technologies.  
We proxy for energy prices using the lagged value of the IEA energy price index for 
industry (IEA, 2017). The higher the cost of energy, the higher the incentives to engage 
in energy efficiency as a way to reduce production costs.  
The share of manufacturing value added in total value added (World Bank, 2013) 
measures the weight of the manufacturing sector. It is not clear what the effect of this 
variable is a priori. A positive effect may arise from because policy measures are more 
likely in countries with larger manufacturing sectors as they result in larger benefits in 
terms of lower production costs and emissions; or because stronger lobbies put pressure 
on governments to put in place fiscal incentives to lower the costs of energy inputs. 
Conversely, a negative impact could arise from a large manufacturing sector resisting 
policy intervention.  
Energy use as a share of GDP (World Bank, 2013) measures the overall energy 
efficiency of a given country. Countries with higher levels of energy efficiency may 
have already reaped the best opportunities and either not feel the need to address the 
issue of energy efficiency or find it harder to implement any additional regulation.  
The share of energy imports as a percentage of merchandise imports (World Bank, 
2013) measures energy dependence from abroad. We expect a positive relation between 
this variable and the latent trait, as promoting energy efficiency is a way to achieve 
energy security and lower energy dependence from abroad.  
The number of energy efficiency patent applications to the EPO by applicants in a 
given country (OECD, 2013) measures the availability of energy efficient technologies. 
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This is expected to increase the likelihood that pro-efficiency regulation is passed, given 
that improvement should be more easily reached vis-à-vis countries with no technology 
available. 
Further, we assume that between country variation (namely, the likelihood that the 
average performance of countries within the sample is different) systematically differs 
depending on its richness, on institutional characteristics, and on its overall commitment 
to the diffusion of renewable energy. Richer countries in terms of GDP per capita 
(World Bank, 2013) may behave systematically different from poorer countries. Also in 
this case, the direction of the effect is not clear a priori. On the one hand, citizens in 
richer countries may be more concerned with climate and pollution issues, and/or 
governments in richer economies may find it easier to enact regulation promoting 
energy efficiency. On the other hand, richer economies may also be those where the 
pressure of higher energy prices is felt less because they don’t have a tighter budget 
constraint.  
The institutional variables we include in the latent regression are the average level 
of respect for Law and Order and of Quality of the Bureaucracy (ICRG, 2011) as well 
as the length of the democratic system (World Bank 2013). The former are compiled by 
the International Country Risk Guide and measure on a scale between 0 and 6 the degree 
with which a given country successfully implements the law and respects it, or the 
quality of its bureaucratic system. The latter index measures the length of the 
democratic system in years. Our expectation is that higher these variables, the higher the 
propensity to implement policies targeting energy-efficiency. The inclusion of these 
variables are meant to account for the fact that the policy variables (scores) we observe 
do not convey information about stringency or implementation, rather they represent 
purely a count of policies. The latent regression approach thus conditions the estimated 
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countries’ latent traits also on these observables.11 
Lastly, we proxy the diffusion of renewable energy with the average growth of 
renewable electricity by country over the sample period (World Bank 2013).  
Descriptive statistics of these variables by country and for the overall sample are 
displayed in Table 2, which shows large variations within countries. We estimate the 
model specified in (6). The results on covariates coefficients from the explanatory 
model are presented in Table 3.  
All other things equal, higher energy prices are associated with a higher second level 
residual, while higher energy intensity of the economy or a higher GDP per capita are 
associated with lower second level residuals. These results are generally in line with 
expectation, and they confirm that, conditional on all other variables, richer and more 
efficient countries find it harder than poorer and less efficient countries to implement 
energy efficient policies. This may very well be due to the fact, as argued above, that 
richer countries are also those countries who have already benefitted from the cheapest 
opportunities, and are finding it harder to sustained increase level of energy efficiency 
because all their options in this respect are very costly. Finally, the availability of 
energy efficient technologies and the share of energy imports are not precisely 
estimated, even though the coefficients are positive, as expected.  
A larger manufacturing sector, or an established democracy are associated with a 
higher third level residual, while a higher growth rate of renewable electricity or a 
higher score in Law and Order with a lower third level residual. The negative 
coefficient associated with the growth rate of renewable electricity could be explained, 
for instance, by the fact that renewable energy deployment and improvements in energy 
efficient are in fact implemented as substitutes, rather than complements in the countries 
                                                          
11 Ideally we would want to control for institutional characteristics as well as for stringency and 
implementation at the sectoral level rather than at the country level. This is not feasible due to a 
fundamental lack of data. We use country-level proxies under the implicit assumptions that these are 
strongly correlated with the proxies for the manufacturing sector.  
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and period under consideration. The negative coefficient associated with the Law and 
Order variable is consistent with the conjecture that countries with higher enforcement 
may not need to implement an increasingly higher number of policies targeting energy 
efficiency, rather, they have a few effective ones in place. The coefficient of the Quality 
of the bureaucracy is not statistically significant and therefore not precisely estimated.  
The ranking of countries emerging from the explanatory TRLI model is shown to 
change in Figure 5. Specifically, controlling for the observable covariates improves the 
ranking position of those countries which previously scored low because of some 
inhibiting “initial conditions”, for example (i) low energy prices, or (ii) a manufacturing 
sector accounting for a smaller share of their economy, or (iii) a higher degree of energy 
intensity and so forth. Most Eastern European countries, for example, improve their 
ranking, while Northern countries perform worse when their “initial conditions” are 
taken into account.  
A word of caution is due when commenting Figure 5. As a result of the explanatory 
model countries such as, for instance, Bulgaria scores significantly higher than in Figure 
3. Far from being an indication that the policy stringency of this country is higher than 
that of, say, Germany or France, the results of the explanatory model simply suggest 
that over the sample period Bulgaria committed to the highest number of new policies, 
given its initial condition (which was clearly worse than that of other EU countries). 
Hence, while the results of the descriptive model can be taken as representing a 
snapshot of countries’ performances in general, the results of the explanatory model 
convey information about the performance of countries over the sample period 
considered, given their initial condition. The usefulness of the TLRI approach adopted 
in this paper lies precisely in being able to provide both types of information. 
Finally, note that also in the explanatory TLRI model, confidence intervals for 
countries overlap. Even after conditioning of the model on observable country 
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characteristics, the performance of EU countries with respect to commitment towards 
energy efficiency appears to be very similar, and the clustering of countries in different 
and separate groups is not possible. 
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This paper presented a novel approach to assessing and comparing countries’ 
commitment to environmental and energy policy in a given sector. The Three Level 
Random Intercept model we propose allows using the sparse data on countries’ policies 
to derive a ranking and to characterize the complexity of their portfolio of energy and 
environmental policies. In addition, the model can be extended to adjust the ranking as a 
result of country-specific economic and institutional observables which are likely to a 
affect regulation over the sample period. We illustrate the potential of this methodology 
by studying the performance of the EU28 plus Norway with respect to promoting 
energy efficiency over the years 2004-2011. 
We believe the TLRI model is a promising approach to assessing countries’ 
commitment to environmental and energy policy since it is able to overcome a number 
of shortcomings of the previous literature on policy indicators. First, its data 
requirements are relatively limited, allowing to extend the analysis to a much wider set 
of countries than previous analyses. Second, this approach allows attributing different 
weights or difficulty levels to the different policy instruments included in the policy 
portfolio. Thus, our assessment is conditional on the specific complexity of each 
country’s policy portfolio. Third, we combine the basic TLRI model with a latent 
regressions, thereby allowing each country’s scores to be conditioned on the country’s 
observed characteristics. 
Focusing on the results emerging from our application, we show that accounting for 
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economic and institutional characteristics changes the ranking of countries with respect 
to energy efficient policy. Specifically, the position of those countries with worse 
“initial conditions” but which choose to regulate energy efficiency nonetheless, 
demonstrating a higher than average commitment over the sample period, improves. 
We are fully aware that, given the nature of our data, namely count of policies 
which are implemented in each country in any given year, our ranking only informs on 
the general commitment of a given country and it does not shed any light on the actual 
level of stringency of the given policy. While we try to control for this shortcoming in 
our empirical setting by adding covariates capturing the level of respect for law and 
order, our results should be interpreted accordingly.12 
This notwithstanding, basically available efforts to assess national performance of 
countries with respect to energy and environmental policy in general suffer from this 
shortcoming or, if they don’t, they often rely on arbitrary categorization and expert 
scoring, which are often less than transparent to the reader. 
While we believe our methodology is a step forward in the direction of creating an 
index of policy commitment, and possibly stringency, we are also aware that it is not 
completely free from limitations. First, at present our proposed approach allows to study 
the performance of countries in a given sector/aspect of energy and environmental 
policy. Indeed, enlarging the analysis to include other end-use sectors, such as 
households, transport or the tertiary, would entail the development of a four level 
random intercept model which would nest an additional level (i.e., sector) in the 
empirical framework. We have left this effort for future endeavors, given that it 
significantly increases computing time and, most of all, it requires to somehow account 
                                                          
12 Note that ideally when building indexes of policy performance and stringency one would want to 
account for the contribution of each policy to the specified country targets. This is indeed a crucial point, 
but one that at present we cannot address due a fundamental lack of data as well as of a methodology to 
calculate the contribution of several policies, which are often implemented, to a specified future target. 
This is clearly a very interesting avenue for future research.  
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that the policy instruments applied in one sector are necessarily of a different nature 
from those applied in another sector.  
Another natural follow-up of this paper is to assess how our approach fares 
compared with other indicators of energy and environmental policy stringency proposed 
in the literature, which we briefly considered in Section 2.
13
 More generally, the 
application of our methodology to other fields of study where similar data on policy 
implementation is available is also very promising. This might include, among other, 
labor or monetary policy. The model presented in this paper could also be fruitfully 
extended to account for the presence of random slopes (as opposed to only random 
intercepts) and to better study the effect of time. To this end, focusing on a wider 
sample of countries would be beneficial, since variation in policy responses of the EU 
member states is necessarily limited given the common framework under which these 
policies are developed. Our current research is moving in this direction. 
                                                          
13 A companion paper (Galeotti, Salini, and Verdolini, 2017), whose content could not be presented here 
due to obvious space constraints, is a first attempt in that direction. 
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Environmental policy performance and its determinants: application of a 
three-level random intercept model  
Tables  
 
 
Table 1: Estimation of Item/Policy Thresholds 
Difficulty Thresholds Coefficient Standard Error p-value 
Regulatory Policy - Threshold 1 0.47 0.22 0.03 
Regulatory Policy - Threshold 2 1.87 0.31 0.00 
Voluntary Measures - Threshold 1 0.51 0.23 0.03 
Voluntary Measures - Threshold 2 1.01 0.29 0.00 
Voluntary Measures - Threshold 3 0.87 0.35 0.01 
Financial Instruments -Threshold 1 -0.73 0.26 0.00 
Financial Instruments -Threshold 2 0.35 0.26 0.19 
Financial Instruments -Threshold 3 -0.17 0.28 0.53 
Financial Instruments -Threshold 4 1.14 0.30 0.00 
Fiscal/Tax Reductions - Threshold 1 1.29 0.23 0.00 
Fiscal/Tax Reductions - Threshold 2 2.43 0.41 0.00 
Information/Education - Threshold 1 0.43 0.23 0.07 
Information/Education - Threshold 2 0.57 0.27 0.03 
Information/Education - Threshold 3 1.10 0.33 0.00 
Variances of random effects    
Second Level Variance (Time) 9.46e-21 1.953e-11 0.00 
Second Level Variance (Country) 0.73 0.22 0.00 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Covariates of the Latent Regression 
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Electricity
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A
ustria
25.40
1.393
11.22
0.135
42.585
6
3.917
52.08
0.0275
19.66
Belgium
20.62
1.536
12.44
0.191
41.466
5.475
4
76.53
0.148
17
Bulgaria
0.833
1.251
14.48
0.796
5.357
4.261
2
16.42
0.0692
16.29
Croatia
0.143
1.376
16.09
0.241
12.734
4.917
2.853
14.64
0.0245
17.40
Cyprus
2.269
1.320
17.94
0.187
27.01
4.315
3.591
.
.
8.780
Czech Republic
3.042
1.433
8.413
0.408
17.339
5.204
3
16.58
0.0621
24.53
D
enm
ark
74.17
1.582
6.378
0.0975
53.45
6
4
75.92
0.0710
14.49
Estonia
1
1.331
15.13
0.492
14.445
4
2.628
14.93
0.0280
17.05
Finland
20.43
1.535
15.43
0.227
43.676
6
3.980
76.50
0.0154
23.33
France
93.20
1.563
14.02
0.155
38.891
5.148
3.620
76.67
0.0390
13.50
G
erm
any
386.7
1.580
11.24
0.149
38.91
5.407
3.992
58.46
0.113
22.45
G
reece
3.367
1.463
18.30
0.157
25.083
3.969
2.747
32.47
0.0524
9.338
H
ungary
2.308
1.416
8.758
0.299
12.757
4.787
3.299
16.62
0.0928
22.41
Ireland
8.786
1.541
8.909
0.0935
51.23
5.404
3.866
76.50
0.105
26.15
Italy
57.18
1.652
14.29
0.126
34.084
4.863
2.940
30.79
0.0818
18.68
Latvia
0.400
1.247
13.74
0.346
10.513
4.865
2.372
13.53
-0.000226
12.41
Lithuania
0
1.218
23.40
0.413
10.445
4
2.372
10.23
0.0638
19.21
Luxem
bourg
5.333
1.326
9.213
0.145
98.952
6
3.980
76.67
0.111
8.878
M
alta
0.333
1.469
14.07
0.185
18.27
4.567
2.642
31.60
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N
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4
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20.13
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6
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1.372
10.41
0.363
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4.506
2.562
16.33
0.0516
18.22
Portugal
3.827
1.521
14.00
0.165
21.006
5.090
2.744
30.73
0.0549
15.23
Rom
ania
0.667
1.277
11.79
0.453
7.249
3.682
0.769
14.83
0.0620
22.98
Slovakia (Slovak Republic)
1.143
1.479
12.56
0.443
14.505
4.593
3.058
14.29
0.0685
23.25
Slovenia
0.733
1.324
11.06
0.242
21.954
4.673
3
15.33
0.0407
23.69
Spain
48.79
1.303
15.84
0.150
29.575
4.694
3.171
29.47
0.0870
16.05
Sw
eden
28.24
1.599
12.04
0.166
47.111
6
4
76.53
0.0322
19.25
U
nited K
ingdom
66.08
1.721
9.548
0.120
39.145
5.465
4
76.36
0.130
13.41
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Table 3: Results on Second and Third Level Covariates 
V
ariable 
C
oefficient 
Standard Error 
t ratio 
Covariates of Second Level 
Random Effect (Time) 
 
 
 
Energy Price (t-1) 
1.2506 
0.2684 
4.6595 
Energy Intensity (t-1) 
-1.661 
0.7802 
2.1289 
Fuel Im
ports, %
 of 
M
erchandise Im
ports (t-1) 
0.0141 
0.0142 
0.9930 
G
D
P per capita, (t-1) 
-0.0162 
0.0073 
2.2192 
Energy Efficient Patent 
A
pplications to EPO
 (t-1) 
0.0021 
0.0013 
1.6154 
 
 
 
 
Covariates of Third Level 
Random Effect (Country) 
 
 
 
M
anufacturing in V
alue 
A
dded, %
 of G
D
P (m
ean) 
0.0745 
0.0243 
3.0658 
G
row
th rate of Renew
able 
Electricity, (m
ean) 
-5.1386 
2.3542 
2.1827 
Law
 and O
rder (m
ean) 
-0.9709 
0.39 
2.4895 
Q
uality of the Bureaucracy 
(m
ean) 
0.0964 
0.3394 
0.2840 
Length of D
em
ocracy (m
ean) 
0.0325 
0.0085 
3.8235 
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Figure 1: Policy variables distributions per country and year. (a) Regulatory Policy, (b) 
Voluntary agreements, (c) Financial instruments, (d) Fiscal/tax reduction, (e) 
Information/Education 
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